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The quantum Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph (PBR) theorem addresses the question of whether the
quantum state corresponds to a ψ-ontic model (system’s physical state) or to a ψ-epistemic model
(observer’s knowledge about the system). We reformulate the PBR theorem as a Monty Hall game,
and show that winning probabilities, for switching doors in the game, depend whether it is a ψ-ontic
or ψ-epistemic game. For certain cases of the latter, switching doors provides no advantage. We
also apply the concepts involved to quantum teleportation, in particular for improving reliability.
Introduction: No-go theorems in quantum foundations
are vitally important for our understanding of quantum
physics. Bell’s theorem [1] exemplifies this by showing
that locally realistic models must contradict the experi-
mental predictions of quantum theory.
There are various ways of viewing Bell’s theorem
through the framework of game theory [2]. These are
commonly referred to as nonlocal games, and the best
known example is the CHSH game; in this scenario the
participants can win the game at a higher probability
with quantum resources, as opposed to having access to
only classical resources. There has also been work on the
relationship between Bell’s theorem and Bayesian game
theory [3–5]; in a subset of cases it was shown that quan-
tum resources provide an advantage, and lead to quan-
tum Nash equilibria. In [6], it was shown that quantum
nonlocality can outperform classical strategies in games
where participants have conflicting interests. In [7], a
nonlocal game was constructed where quantum resources
did not offer an advantage.
Beyond Bell’s theorem, entropic uncertainty relations
can be viewed in the framework of a guessing game [8,
9]; the uncertainty relation constraints the participant’s
ability to win the game. More broadly, the relationship
between quantum theory and game theory is investigated
in [10–12]. The Monty Hall game [13–16] has also been
generalized into quantum versions [17–23].
The Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph (PBR) theorem [24] is a
relatively recent no-go theorem in quantum foundations.
It addresses the question of whether the quantum state
corresponds to a ψ-ontic model (physical state of a sys-
tem) or to a ψ-epistemic model (observer’s knowledge
about the system) [25]. Notable developments on the
PBR theorem and ψ-epistemic models have been carried
out in [26–34], including on the issue of quantum indis-
tinguishability [35–37], as well being interpreted through
the language of communication protocols [38, 39].
Analogous to the game formulation of Bell’s theorem,
a desirable construction is to view the PBR theorem
through the lens of a game. One instantiation of this is in
an exclusion game where the participant’s goal is to pro-
duce a particular bit string [40, 41]; this has been shown
to be related to the task of quantum bet hedging [42].
Furthermore, concepts involved in the PBR proof have
been used for a particular guessing game [43].
In this Letter, we reformulate the PBR theorem into
a Monty Hall game. This particular gamification of the
theorem highlights that winning probabilities, for switch-
ing doors in the game, depend on whether it is a ψ-ontic
or ψ-epistemic game; we also show that in certain ψ-
epistemic games switching doors provides no advantage.
This may have consequences for an alternative experi-
mental test of the PBR theorem. Furthermore, we shall
also use the concepts involved for modifying quantum
teleportation [44, 45] to view it as a Monty Hall game.
Using these notions, we develop an error-correcting strat-
egy for unreliable teleportation which may be relevant for
practical quantum networks.
PBR theorem: We provide a rough sketch of the PBR
proof [24], and highlight crucial outcomes. Two quantum
systems are prepared independently, and each system is
prepared in either state |0〉 or state |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2.
This means that the total system is in one of the four
possible non-orthogonal quantum states:
|Ψ1〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 , |Ψ2〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |+〉 ,
|Ψ3〉 = |+〉 ⊗ |0〉 , |Ψ4〉 = |+〉 ⊗ |+〉 . (1)
The total system is brought together and measured in
the following entangled basis:
|Φ1〉 = 1√2 (|0〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |0〉),
|Φ2〉 = 1√2 (|0〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |+〉),
|Φ3〉 = 1√2 (|+〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |−〉 ⊗ |0〉),
|Φ4〉 = 1√2 (|+〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |−〉 ⊗ |+〉), (2)
where |−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2.
Invoking the Born probabilities, |〈Φi|Ψh〉|2, where
i, h = 1, 2, 3, 4, we have for i = h, |〈Φi|Ψi〉|2 = 0. This
means that for any value i, the outcome |Φi〉 never oc-
curs when the system is prepared in quantum state |Ψi〉.
The PBR proof showed that in ψ-epistemic models there
is a non-zero probability q (whose value does not need to
be specified) that outcome |Φi〉 occurs when state |Ψi〉 is
prepared, thereby contradicting the predictions of quan-
tum theory; hence one can infer that the quantum state
corresponds to a ψ-ontic model.
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2Classic Monty Hall: A character named Monty hosts
a game show. There are three closed doors respectively
labelled {1, 2, 3}. There is a prize behind one door, and
goats behind the remaining two. The prize door is de-
noted Ai where i takes one of the door labels, and this
choice of prize door is made by the producers of the show.
We assume in the game that when a random choice needs
to be made, all options are chosen with the same proba-
bility. Hence, we have P (Ai) = 1/3 for all values i. The
contestant on the show, who doesn’t know which door
the prize is behind, gets to pick a door; we label this
as Bj where j takes door labels; given this is a random
choice, we have P (Bj |Ai) = 1/3, for all values i, j. Next,
Monty who knows where the prize is, has to open a goat
door, Ck where k takes one door labels. Monty’s decision
is constrained through the game rule that he can’t open
the door chosen by the contestant. Hence we have the
following conditional probabilities:
P (Ck |Bj ∩Ai) =

1
2 , if i = j 6= k,
1, if i 6= j 6= k,
0, otherwise.
(3)
Once a goat door is opened, Monty offers the contestant
the option to stick with the original choice or switch to
the other unopened door. By sticking, the contestant’s
probability of opening the prize door is 1/3. Counter-
intuitively, by switching doors, the probability of winning
increases to 2/3. This can be seen by computing the non-
zero joint probabilities for all events
P (Ai ∩Bj ∩ Ck) = P (Ck |Bj ∩Ai)P (Bj |Ai)P (Ai),
and then summing those values for the events where the
contestant would win by switching. This results in
P (win if switch) =
∑
i6=j 6=k
P (Ai ∩Bj ∩ Ck) = 2
3
. (4)
Ignorant Monty Hall: Just as in the Classic case, we
have P (Ai) = 1/3 and P (Bj |Ai) = 1/3, for all values i, j.
But in this game, Monty doesn’t know what lies behind
any of the doors. The only constraint is that Monty can’t
open the door chosen by the contestant, hence we have
P (Ck |Bj ∩Ai) =
{
0, if j = k,
1
2 , otherwise,
(5)
There is now a probability that he will open up the prize
door by accident, and thus ending the game:
P (opens prize door) =
∑
i=k 6=j
P (Ai ∩Bj ∩ Ck) = 1
3
.
This implies that the probability that he opens a goat
door is 2/3. The joint probability that Monty opens a
goat door and the contestant wins by switching doors can
be computed to be 1/3. From the last two values, we can
calculate the conditional probability
P (win if switch | opens goat door) = 1/3
2/3
=
1
2
. (6)
This means if Monty opens a goat door, then the con-
testant’s probability of winning is the same whether the
contestant chooses to switch the door or not.
ψ-ontic Monty Hall game: Antidistinguishability [32,
46, 47], where there is a measurement for which each out-
come identifies that a specific member of a set of quantum
states was definitely not prepared, is highlighted in the
PBR proof by |〈Φi|Ψi〉|2 = 0 for all i. We will exploit
this to construct our game, which can be thought of as a
quantum Ignorant Monty Hall game.
For state |Ψ1〉 in (1), we have
|〈Φ1|Ψ1〉|2 = 0, |〈Φ2|Ψ1〉|2 = 1/4,
|〈Φ3|Ψ1〉|2 = 1/4, |〈Φ4|Ψ1〉|2= 1/2. (7)
For the other states in (1), the same probability distri-
bution (0, 1/4, 1/4, 1/2) occur but across the different
outcomes (2); hence we will focus our game on |Ψ1〉, but
similar constructions hold for the other states.
The Monty Hall gamification is as follows: There are
four doors labelled {1, 2, 3, 4}, and these correspond to
the different measurement outcomes listed in (2). The
prize door Ai, where i takes one of the door labels, is
the outcome |Φi〉 that the state |Ψ1〉 collapses to upon
measurement. For a ψ-ontic game, through the Born
probabilities (7), we have P (Ai) = |〈Φi|Ψ1〉|2.
The contestant on the show doesn’t know what state
from (1) is used, and is only aware of the possible mea-
surement outcomes (2). Based on this limited informa-
tion, the contestant randomly picks one of the doors
which we denote Bj where j is the corresponding door
label; hence we have P (Bj |Ai) = 1/4, for all values i, j.
Monty’s decision corresponds to the predictions of
quantum theory. He is aware that state |Ψ1〉 was used,
and has access to the Born probabilities (7). The door
opened by Monty is denoted Ck where k is one of the door
labels. The main insight to construct this game is that
when Monty opens a goat door, he is opening a door that
has probability zero of having a prize in it. And for our
game, a door that definitely does not have a prize in it
corresponds to outcome |Φ1〉 as P (A1) = |〈Φ1|Ψ1〉|2 = 0.
Hence in this game, Monty will open door C1 unless the
contestant has already chosen this door as their pick (as
Monty can’t open the door chosen by the contestant);
in that case Monty will open one of the other remaining
doors with equal probability, and there is a chance he
may open up the prize door as in the Ignorant Monty
Hall game. From these factors, one can compute,
P (Ck |Bj ∩Ai) =

1
3 , if j = 1 and k = 2, 3, 4,
1, if j 6= 1 and k = 1,
0, otherwise.
(8)
3The probability that Monty opens the prize door is
P (opens prize door) =
∑
i=k 6=j
P (Ai ∩Bj ∩ Ck) = 1
12
.
This implies that the probability that he opens a goat
door is 11/12. Monty then offers the option to stick or
switch. Suppose the contestant always sticks with the
initial choice. Then the probability of winning if sticking
and Monty opening a goat door is∑
i=j 6=k
P (Ai ∩Bj ∩ Ck) = 1
4
.
With that, we can compute the conditional probability
P (win if stick | opens goat door) = 1/4
11/12
=
3
11
. (9)
Suppose the contestant decides to always switch to one
of the other two unopened doors with equal probability
1/2. Let |Φl〉 be the outcome switched to and let Dl
be the corresponding door. With that, we can compute
P (Ai ∩Bj ∩Ck ∩Dj) = P (Dl |Ck ∩Bj ∩Ai)P (Ck |Bj ∩
Ai)P (Bj |Ai)P (Ai). Hence, the probability of winning if
switching and Monty opening a goat door is∑
i=l 6=j 6=k
P (Ai ∩Bj ∩ Ck ∩Dj) = 1
3
. (10)
From that, one can calculate
P (win if switch | opens goat door) = 1/3
11/12
=
4
11
. (11)
In a ψ-ontic game, switching provides an advantage.
ψ-epistemic Monty Hall game: In the PBR proof, for
the ψ-epistemic model, there is a non-zero probability q
that outcome |Φ1〉 occurs when state |Ψ1〉 is prepared.
This implies that in a ψ-epistemic game, P (A1) = q 6= 0.
To allow for a comparison with the ψ-ontic game, let
q = q1 + q2 + q3, and with that let the other prize door
probabilities take values P (A2) = (1/4) − q1, P (A3) =
(1/4)− q2 and P (A4) = (1/2)− q3.
As in the ψ-ontic game, P (Bj |Ai) = 1/4, for all values
i, j. Monty as a character corresponds to the predictions
of quantum theory (7); he will assume C1 is definitely a
goat door since |〈Φ1|Ψ1〉|2 = 0. This means the prob-
abilities in (8) apply in this game as well. Hence, the
probability that Monty opens the prize door
P (opens prize door) =
∑
i=k 6=j
P (Ai∩Bj ∩Ck) = 1
12
+
2q
3
.
This implies that the probability that Monty opens a goat
door is (11/12) − (2q/3). The probability of winning if
always sticking and that Monty opens a goat door is∑
i=j 6=k
P (Ai ∩Bj ∩ Ck) = 1
4
.
From this we compute
P (win if stick | opens goat door) = 3
11− 8q . (12)
If a switching strategy is adopted then:∑
i=l 6=j 6=k
P (Ai ∩Bj ∩ Ck ∩Dj) = 1
3
− q
3
, (13)
P (win if switch | opens goat door) = 4− 4q
11− 8q . (14)
Thus the probabilities depend on whether the game is
a ψ-ontic or ψ-epistemic game. For value q = 1/4, we
can calculate that P (win if switch | opens goat door) =
P (win if stick | opens goat door); hence for certain ψ-
epistemic games, switching offers no advantage.
Experimental implications: Comparing a ψ-ontic game
to a ψ-epistemic game, Monty opens the prize door less
often. This corresponds to certain probabilities in the
PBR proof being zero; some work on the experimental
tests [24, 48–51] of PBR discuss this exact zero probabil-
ity as an experimental difficulty. Through our game, we
provide another viewpoint; the difference in the proba-
bilities of winning conditioned that a goat door is opened
are simply different for the two physical scenarios. This
may provide insights to alternative experimental designs
to test PBR.
Quantum teleportation: Consider the standard pro-
tocol [45]. Alice wants to send some unknown state
|ψ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 to Bob. They each possess a mem-
ber of the Bell state |β00〉 = 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉). The initial
state is |ψ〉 ⊗ |β00〉. Alice applies a CNOT gate to her
qubits, followed by a Hadamard gate to her first qubit.
The resulting state can be written as
1
2
(
|00〉 (α |0〉+ β |1〉) + |01〉 (α |1〉+ β |0〉)
+ |10〉 (α |0〉 − β |1〉) + |11〉 (α |1〉 − β |0〉)
)
. (15)
When Alices measures her qubits she gets one of the re-
sults on the left in (16). Bob would then apply the cor-
responding Pauli operator on his qubit to obtain |ψ〉:
00→ Does nothing,
01→ Applies σx = |0〉 〈1|+ |1〉 〈0| ,
10→ Applies σz = |0〉 〈0| − |1〉 〈1| ,
11→ Applies σzσx. (16)
Bob receives the two bits from Alice in (16) through a
classical channel. This protocol has been extended to
probabilistic cases [52–54] and noisy cases [55–59].
Monty Hall teleportation: For our first application, we
want to modify the standard teleportation protocol into
a Monty Hall game. Alice can be viewed as Monty, and
Bob as the contestant. The four doors are respectively
4labelled (00, 01, 10, 11). This coincides with Alice’s pos-
sible measurement results in (16); the prize door is Al-
ice’s actual result, whose bits we denote ab, and what
Bob would need get the desired state |ψ〉. The contes-
tant’s initial choice of door would be equivalent to what
Bell state was used at the start of the protocol. In this
modification, the contestant is allowed to choose any of
the four doors (00, 01, 10, 11), which we denote xy. This
event coincides with using Bell state
|βxy〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |y〉+ (−1)x |1〉 |y¯〉), (17)
where y¯ is the negation of y. As an example, if the con-
testant chooses door 01, then a way to implement this
is that Bob applies the operator (σ0 ⊗ σz) |β00〉 = |β01〉,
and communicates that to Alice; the last step would be
analogous to Monty being aware of what door the contes-
tant chooses. In this modified protocol, the initial state is
|ψ〉 |βxy〉. After Alice applies a CNOT gate to her qubits
followed by a Hadamard gate the resulting state is
1
2
(
|00〉 (α |y〉+ β(−1)x |y¯〉) + |01〉 (α(−1)x |y¯〉+ β |y〉)
+ |10〉 (α |y〉 − β(−1)x |y¯〉) + |11〉 (α(−1)x |y¯〉 − β |y〉)
)
.
At this step, Alice measures her qubits to get her result.
If Alice’s result is ab = xy, meaning it coincides with the
Bell state used |βxy〉, then Bob has to do nothing and he
has the desired state |ψ〉 (the exception is if the initial
Bell state used was |β11〉 in which case Bob has to apply
operator (−σ0) to get |ψ〉 if result is 11). This is why the
contestant’s initial choice relates to the Bell state used.
In this Monty Hall protocol, Alice sends Bob two bits
as in (16) with the following modification: she chooses
two bits denoted cd (ie goat door) that are not xy (ie
contestant’s initial choice) and are not ab (ie prize door).
Should Bob do nothing, or apply one of the possible op-
erators (which depend on what Bell state was used) to
get |ψ〉 ie should the contestant stick or switch?
To answer this, let Bxy be the door chosen by con-
testant. For this example, assume we use |β00〉, hence
P (B00) = 1. Let Aab be the prize door and due to Born
probabilities we have P (Aab) = 1/4. Let Ccd be the goat
door opened by Monty whose probabilities, from the pro-
tocol description, work out as:
P (Ccd |B00 ∩Aab) =

1
3 , if 00 = ab 6= cd,
1
2 , if 00 6= ab 6= cd,
0, otherwise.
(18)
If Bob always does nothing (ie, stick strategy), then
P (win if stick) =
∑
ab=006=cd
P (Aab∩B00∩Ccd) = 2
8
. (19)
Suppose Bob decides to always apply one of the two op-
erators (ie, switch strategy). Then there are one of two
possibilities which we denote ef and given its a random
choice, each occur with probability 1/2. Let Def repre-
sent that door, and P (win if switch) is∑
ab=ef 6=cd 6=00
P (Aab ∩B00 ∩ Ccd ∩Def ) = 3
8
. (20)
This means Bob should apply one of the two operators
(switch) rather than do nothing (stick) to get state |ψ〉.
Unreliable teleportation: For our second application,
consider the standard teleportation protocol with the fol-
lowing unreliability: one of the two bits (either the first
or second) Alice sends to Bob in (16) is received but the
other is lost; each event occurs with probability 1/2. If
the initial Bell state is |β00〉 and Alice’s result is 00, then
Bob can do nothing. But in this scenario, if Bob re-
ceives the single bit as 1, then the possible options are
01, 10, or 11; in this case he should apply one of the op-
erators (switch). If Bob receives bit 0, then his options
are 00, 01, 10. Should he stick (to 00) or switch (to 01 or
10)? To answer this, let us use the notation developed.
We have P (B00) = 1 and P (Aab) = 1/4 . Let d in
Cd be the single bit received by Bob; based on the sce-
nario described above, we have P (C0 |B00 ∩ A00) = 1,
P (C0 |B00 ∩ A01) = 1/2, and P (C0 |B00 ∩ A10) = 1/2.
We can compute the probability that Bob receives bit 0:
P (received bit 0) =
∑
ab6=11
P (C0 ∩B00 ∩Aab) = 1
2
.
If Bob decides to always do nothing then this would be
like a sticking strategy. The probability that bit 0 is
received and Bob wins by sticking is P (A00∩B00∩C0) =
1/4. Hence we can compute the conditional probability:
P (win if stick | received bit 0) = 1/4
1/2
=
1
2
. (21)
If an always switching strategy is adopted, then there are
two possibilities (01 or 10) each occuring with probability
1/2. In this case probability of winning if switched and
bit 0 is received is P (A01 ∩ B00 ∩ C0 ∩ D01) + P (A10 ∩
B00 ∩ C0 ∩D10) = 1/8. With that we compute,
P (win if switch | received bit 0) = 1/8
1/2
=
1
4
. (22)
It is an advantage to stick ie Bob should do nothing.
This strategy may used as an error-correcting design for
reliability issues in practical quantum networks [60, 61]
Conclusions: We have reformulated PBR theorem into
a Monty Hall game. We argue that future investigation
of Monty Hall concepts applied to antidistinguishability
scenarios will lead to novel quantum protocols.
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